BH Hasid LLC, Order on Pending Motions by Bonner, Alice D.
Georgia State University College of Law 
Reading Room 
Georgia Business Court Opinions 
2-19-2019 
BH Hasid LLC, Order on Pending Motions 
Alice D. Bonner 
Fulton County Superior Court, Judge 
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons 
Institutional Repository Citation 
Bonner, Alice D., "BH Hasid LLC, Order on Pending Motions" (2019). Georgia Business Court Opinions. 
481. 
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt/481 
This Court Order is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Georgia Business Court Opinions by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please 
contact gfowke@gsu.edu. 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
BH HASID LLC, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, 
V. 
ARYEH KIEFFER, ADDISON CAPITAL 
LLC, and ADDISON ADVISORS LLC, 
Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
V. 
HASID HOLDINGS, LLC and 
RONI A VRAHAM, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 
20 l 7CV298598 
Business Case Div. 1 
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS 
The above styled action is before the Court on the following pending motions: (1) 
Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Parties' Associated 
Florida Action ("Defendants' Motion to Stay"); (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Appeal; (3) 
Plaintiffs Motion for Accounting; and (4) Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. Having considered the entire record and argument of counsel at a 
February 12, 2019 hearing in this matter, the Court finds as follows: 
SUMMARY OFF ACTS 
This suit arises out of a dispute regarding the business dealings of Plaintiff BH Hasid, 
LLC ("Plaintiff'), Defendant Aryeh Kieffer ("Kieffer") and entities wholly owned and managed 
by Kieffer, Defendants Addison Capital, LLC ("Addison Capital") and Addison Advisors, LLC 
("Addison Advisors").' 
In 2012, the parties agreed to purchase and renovate apartment complexes in the Atlanta 
area. Ultimately, they purchased five Georgia properties, each owned by a separate Florida 
limited liability company ("LLC"): BH Chamblee, LLC ("BH Chamblee") owns The Heights at 
Chamblee property ("Chamblee Property"); BH Winston Manor, LLC ("BH Winston Manor") 
owns the Winston Manor property ("Winston Manor Property"); Addison Hasid IV, LLC ("AH 
IV") owns the Washington Arms property ("Washjngton Arms Property"); Addison Hasid V, 
LLC ("AH V") owns the Roosevelt property ("Roosevelt Property"); and Addison Hasid VI, 
LLC ("AH VI") owns the Sierra Ridge property ("Sierra Ridge Property").2 
The parties' agreement as to the terms of their relationship was memorialized in a written 
agreement in Hebrew ("Hebrew Agreement"). Although there is only one signed Hebrew 
Agreement in existence and it expressly concerns the first property the parties purchased, the 
Chamblee Property, the parties agree that the terms of the Hebrew Agreement governed certain 
terms of their partnership. Specifically, Kieffer testified that the parties' agreement was that 
Tzion Hasid would contribute 90% of the purchase price of the properties and that Kieffer would 
contribute the remaining 10%.3 It also undisputed that Kieffer, via his entity Addison Capital, 
would serve as the manager of the Subject Entities and the Subject Properties. 
In addition to the Hebrew Agreement, there exists an operating agreement for each of the 
Throughout this Order, Defendants will be referred to collectively as "Defendants." 
2 The five LCCs are referred to collectively herein as the "Subject Entities" and the five properties are 
collectively referred to as the "Subject Properties." 
3 Q: My understanding is that you testified that you had an informal agreement with Mr. Hasid to contribute 
IO percent of the capital for the five entities, right? 
A: I would say subsequent to the Chamblee deal, it was an understanding between the two ofus. 
Q: That understanding was based on the Hebrew Agreement in part, right? 
A: It was based on our conversation that this is what the terms of our partnership would be. 
Kieffer Deposition, 25: 16-25 (April I 0, 2018). 
2 
five Subject Entities the parties created to own the five Subject Properties (the "OAs"). The OAs, 
on their face, appear to contain two categories of signatures: for "THE COMP ANY" (specific 
entity) by Keiffer, in his capacity as a manager of Addison Capital, LLC, which in tum is the 
manager of the specific entity; and for "THE MEMBERS" by Addison Capita], LLC, signed by 
Kieffer as its manager, and BH Hasid LLC, signed by Tzion Hasid, as the manager for Hasid 
Brothers Atlanta LTD, which in turn is the manager for BH Hasid, LLC. However, Plaintiff 
disputes their enforceability and alleges that Tzion Hasid was fraudulently induced into signing 
them. 
The record before this Court reflects that Kieffer secured his portion of the capital 
contributions for the five entities from loans. A total of three loans were taken out - the PrivCap 
loan, the Resurgens loan, and the Silver Point loan (collectively the "Loans"). 
PrivCap Loan 
The PrivCap loan was issued in December 2012, the day before BH Hasid and Addison 
Capital closed on the purchase of the Chamblee Property. The borrower on the loan was BH 
Chamblee and the loan was secured by the Chamblee Property. Kieffer was a personal guarantor 
on the loan. When BH Chamblee took out the Resurgens loan in April 2013, a portion of it was 
used to pay off the PrivCap loan. 
Resurgens Loan 
The Resurgens loan was issued in April 2013 as a construction loan for the Chamblee 
Property. The Resurgens loan was secured by the Chamblee Property and was guaranteed by the 
Alexanders, the parties' former business partners who are not parties to this litigation. At its 
highest, the Resurgens loan reached $2.2 million. The record reflects that a distribution of 
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$50,000 was made out of the proceeds of the Resurgens loan to Tzion Hasid.4 
Silver Point Loan 
The Silver Point loan was issued in June 2015 to BH Chamblee as borrower and was 
guaranteed by the Roosevelt, Sierra Ridge, and Chamblee Properties.' The initial amount of the 
loan was over $6 mil." The Silver Point loan was increased on several occasions and as of the 
April 2018 Hearing, the balance on the loan was a little over $9 million.7 
CHOICE OF LAW 
The parties agree that Florida law applies to the substantive issues presented in the 
pending motions given a Florida choice of law provision in the OAs.8 However, Defendants 
additionally contend that Florida law also applies to the procedural issues before this Court. 
It is well established law that "[u]nder traditional choice of law principles, the law of the 
forum State governs on matters of procedure." Keeton v. Hustler Magazine. Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 
778, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1480, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984); see also Continental Ins. Co. v. Equity 
Residential Properties Trust, 255 Ga. App. 445, 565 S.E.2d 603 (2002) ("The rule of lex fori 
dictates that Georgia courts will apply Georgia law governing procedural or remedial matters."); 
Brinson v. Martin, 220 Ga. App. 638, 469 S.E.2d 537 (1996) ("Under the rule of lex Jori, 
procedural or remedial questions are governed by the law of the forum, the state in which the 
action is brought"). Accordingly, in considering the parties' motions the Court applies Florida 
law as to substantive matters and Georgia law on matters of procedure. 
Kieffer Deposition, 152:3-10 (April I 0, 2018). 
Hearing Transcript, 169: 1-6; 180:7-9 (April 11, 2018). 
Kieffer Deposition, 183:10-18 (April 10, 2018). 
Kieffer Deposition, 155: 12-14 (April I 0, 2018). 
Operating Agreement of Addison Hasid V, LLC, ,33 ("This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Florida."); Operating Agreement of Addison Hasid IV, LLC, ~33 ("This 
Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida."); Amended 
Operating Agreement of BH Chamblee, LLC, ~33 ("This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Florida."); Addison Hasid IV, LLC and BH Winston Manor, LLC do not contain choice 






I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING THE 
RESOLUTION OF THE PARTIES' ASSOCIATED FLORIDA ACTION 
Defendants move the Court to stay this action pending the resolution of a related but later 
filed Florida case. Specifically, although this action was filed on Dec. 1, 2107, in January 2018 
Defendants filed a separate action in Florida seeking judicial dissolution of the Subject Entities 
under Florida law ("Florida Lawsuit").9 Defendants assert that insofar as the Subject Entities are 
Florida LLCs that were organized in Florida and are governed by Florida law, and given the 
parties' inability to work together, it was necessary to file the Florida Lawsuit to obtain 
"complete relief', namely the dissolution of the Subject Entities. 10 
Defendants contend the Florida court is best situated to rule on the matters at issue in this 
case because the parties' dispute in this Court is not about the Subject Properties but rather 
concerns ownership in the Subject Entities, their formation and management, and their 
dissolution. Defendants assert this Court "does not have subject matter jurisdiction to properly 
adjudicate BH Hasid's request of the Court to make a declaration that Addison Capital is not a 
member of the limited liability companies."11 Defendants further urge that judicial economy and 
comity warrant a stay of this action because only the Florida court has the power to resolve the 
core issue between the parties-ownership of the Subject Entities. 
"The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 
counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which 
must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." Bloomfield v. Liggett & Mvers. 
Inc., 230 Ga. 484, 484, 198 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1973) (citing Landis v. North American Company, 
9 See Addison Capital, LLC v. BH Hasid, LLC. Case No. 50-2018-CA-000324-XXXX-MB, Circuit Court of 
the I 5tl' Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida. 
10 Defendants' Motion to Stay, p. 3. 
11 Defendants' Motion to Stay, p. 12. 
5 
299 U.S. 248,254, 57 S. Ct. 163, 166, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936)). 
"It is settled law that the priority of pending actions is determined by the dates of filing, if 
service has been effected." Wheeler v. Wheeler, 229 Ga. 84, 85, 189 S.E.2d 427, 429 (1972) 
(citations omitted); see also Sweat v. Barnhill, 171 Ga. 294(6), 155 S.E. 18; McFarland v. 
McFarland, 151 Ga. 9(2), l 05 S.E. 596. However, a trial court has "discretion to stay a Georgia 
proceeding pending the disposition of a prior pending action in another jurisdiction." Black v. 
Black, 292 Ga. 691, 694-95, 740 S.E.2d 613, 618 (2013) (citing Flagg Energy Dev. Corp. v. 
General Motors Corp., 223 Ga. App. 259, 261(2), 477 S.E.2d 402 (1996)); see also Bloomfield 
v. Liggett & Myers. Inc., 129 Ga. App. 141, 141, 198 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1973) (affirming trial 
court's stay of proceedings pending determination of suit previously :filed by defendants against 
plaintiff in New York federal district coLU1 where plaintiffs claim arose out of transaction or 
occurrence that was subject matter of defendants' suit against plaintiff in federal court). 
Having considered the record and the authorities cited above, the Court finds Defendants 
have not made the requisite showing that a stay of this case is warranted. Insofar as this action 
was filed first and the Court has proper jurisdiction over the claims asserted in this matter, the 
Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion to Stay. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL 
Plaintiff moves this Court to dismiss Defendants' appeaJ from this Court's ruling granting 
Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief. On April 11-12, 2018, the Court held a 
comprehensive hearing on all pending motions and requests for preliminary injunctive relief 
("April 2018 Hearing"). At the conclusion of the April 2018 Hearing, the Court issued an oral 
ruling, granting Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief and removing Addison 
Capital as manager of the Subject Properties during the pendency of this case. The oral ruling 
was made the written order of the Court in its Order which was entered on April 24, 2018. 
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Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal the following day, April 25, 2018, and paid the cost 
bill on May 7, 2018. However, Plaintiff asserts Defendants have failed to order and file the 
necessary record (including transcripts from the April 11-12, 2018 Hearing) with the Court of 
Appeals to perfect their appeal. Plaintiff contends Defendants have caused an unreasonable and 
inexcusable delay in placing the case on the earliest possible appellate calendar such that the 
appeal should be dismissed. 
O.C.G.A. §5-6-48(c) provides in part: 
No appeal shall be dismissed by the appellate court nor consideration of 
any error therein refused because of failure of any party to cause the 
transcript of evidence and proceedings to be filed within the time allowed 
by law or order of court; but the trial court may, after notice and 
opportunity for hearing, order that the appeal be dismissed where there has 
been an unreasonable delay in the filing of the transcript and it is shown 
that the delay was inexcusable and was caused by such party . 
As summarized by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in PJ Servs .. Inc. v. Equity Techs. 
Assocs .. Inc., 295 Ga. App. 214,671 S.E.2d 264 (2008): 
Where there is a transcript of evidence and proceedings to be included in 
the record on appeal, the appellant shall cause the transcript to be prepared 
and filed ... within 30 days after filing of the notice of appeal. Pursuant to 
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(c), a trial court may, after notice and opportunity for 
hearing, dismiss an appeal for failure to timely file a transcript when the 
delay is unreasonable, inexcusable, and caused by the party seeking 
the appeal. 
Id. at 215. See also Mon-ell v. W. Servs .. LLC, 291 Ga. App. 369, 373, 662 S.E.2d 215, 218 
(2008). 
However, "[an] appeal should not be dismissed unless the delay is unreasonable so as to 
affect the appeal itself. .. either by prejudicing a party's position or by causing the appeal to be 
stale such as, by delaying just disposition of the case, by preventing placement of the case on the 
earliest possible appellate court calendar, or by delaying the docketing of the appeal and hearing 
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of the case by an appellate court." Coptic Const. Co. v. Rolle, 279 Ga. App. 454, 454-55, 631 
S.E.2d 475, 476 (2006) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). See Jackson v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 213 Ga. App. 172, 172-73, 444 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1994). "A delay of more than 
30 days in filing a transcript as provided by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-42 'is prima facie unreasonable and 
inexcusable, but this presumption is subject to rebuttal if the party comes forward with evidence 
to show that the delay was neither unreasonable nor inexcusable."' PJ Servs .. Inc., 295 Ga. App. 
at 216 (citing Kelly v. Dawson County, 282 Ga. 189,646 S.E.2d 53 (2007)). 
Here, Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal on April 25, 2018 and the notice directed 
the Clerk of Court to omit nothing from the record on appeal. Plaintiff filed its Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal on October 23, 2018 and therein specifically cited Defendants' failure to order a 
transcript of the court proceedings from April 11, 2018, the failure to pay for a transcript of the 
court proceedings from April 12, 2018, and the failure to cause the transcripts to be filed with the 
Court of Appeals of Georgia. As of the February 12, 20 I 9 hearing, 293 days had passed since 
Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal but failed to perfect their appeal by filing the appropriate 
record with the appellate court. The Court finds the delay in filing the relevant transcripts with 
the Court of Appeals is prima facie unreasonable and inexcusable, was caused by Defendants, 
has delayed the docketing of the appeal and hearing of the case by an appellate court, and has 
prevented the placement of the case on the earliest possible appellate court calendar. Plaintiff's 
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. 
m. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR ACCOUNTING 
Plaintiff moves this Court to require Defendants to account for all funds held in certain 
Bank of America accounts belonging to the Subject Entities. Plaintiff asserts that th.rough 
Defendants Addison Capital and Addison Advisors, Defendant Kieffer controlled the following 
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ten bank accounts at Bank of America 12: 
Entity Named on Account Account 
(I) Addison Hasid VI, LLC '9447 
(2) Addison Hasid V, LLC '9377 
(3) BH Chamblee, LLC '6711 
(4) BH Winston Manor, LLC '5884 
(5) Addison Hasid IV, LLC '5631 
(6) BH Chamblee, LLC '4519 
(7) BH Chamblee, LLC '4483 
(8) Addison Hasid, VI, LLC '4035 
(9) Addison Hasid V, LLC '3809 
(10) Addison Advisors, Inc. '0403 
Given that the Court removed Defendants from management of the Subject Entities on 
April 12, 2018 and thereafter Plaintiff BH Hasid appointed itself as the replacement manager, 
Plaintiff contends it is entitled to an accounting of the funds held in the above accounts owned by 
the Subject Entities and should have access to those funds which are necessary for the use and 
maintenance of the Subject Properties. Further, whereas "[u]pon information and belief' all 
funds in the '0403 account held by Addison Advisors "originated from BH Hasid and were 
intended for capital contributions to one of the [Subject] Entities," Plaintiff argues it is also 
entitled to an accounting as to that account and access to those funds.13 Defendants have not 
responded to the Motion for Accounting. 
Insofar as nine of the Bank of America Accounts listed above are held in the name of the 
Subject Entities which are currently managed by Plaintiff BH Hasid and it appears that the funds 
held in the '0403 held by Addison Advisors were provided by Plaintiff and intended as capital 
contributions to the Subject Entities, Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Accounting is hereby 
GRANTED. Defendants are ordered to provide an accounting as to the whereabouts and uses of 
12 
13 
Collectively the "Bank of America Accounts." 
Plaintiffs Amended Motion for Accounting, ~5. 
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all funds held in the Bank of America Accounts identified above and transfer the funds held 
therein to accounts under Plaintiff BR Hasid's control. 
IV. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff BH Hasid and Counterclaim-Defendants Hasid Holdings, LLC and Roni 
Avraham (collectively "Movants") move the Court to enter partial swnmary judgment in their 
favor as to Plaintiff BH Hasid's declaratory judgment claim and on all of Defendants' 
counterclaims. 
A. Applicable Standard 
Under Georgia law, summary judgment should be granted when the movant shows "that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). 
A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, 
affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is 
no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential 
element of plaintiffs case. If there is no evidence sufficient to create a 
genuine issue as to any essential element of plaintiffs claim, that claim 
tumbles like a house of cards. All of the other disputes of fact are rendered 
immaterial. 
Scarbrough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829, 830, 525 S.E.2d 377, 378 (1999) (quoting Lau's Corp. 
v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491, 405 S.E.2d 474, 475-76 (1991), abrogated on other grounds 
by Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735,493 S.E.2d 403 (1997)) (emphasis in original). 
To avoid summary judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code 
section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. 
§9-11-56( e ). In reviewing the record, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party. Morgan v. Barnes, 221 Ga. App. 653, 654, 472 S.E.2d 480, 481 (1996). 
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However, "[m]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility (are] insufficient to preclude summary 
judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (2011) (quoting Rosales v. Davis, 260 Ga. App. 
709,712,580 S.E.2d 662,665 (2003)); see Ellison v. Burger King Corp., 294 Ga. App. 814, 819, 
670 S.E.2d 469,474 (2008); Pafford v. Biomet, 264 Ga. 540,544,448 S.E.2d 347,350 (1994). 
B. Preliminary issues 
1) Burden of Proof as Lo Affirmative Defenses 
Defendants assert the motion should be denied because Movants have failed to show that 
Defendants' previously asserted defenses are legally insufficient. Defendants filed their 
Amended Answer on November 13, 2018 and asserted the following affirmative defenses: all 
defenses contained in O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-8 and 9-11-12; waiver and estoppel; unclean hands; the 
parties had mutually departed from and all operating agreements; Plaintiff ratified the actions 
complained of; Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages; Defendants were not the proximate cause of 
Plaintiff's damages; Plaintiff frustrated Defendants' performance; lack of equity; business 
judgment rule; acquiescence; and that Plaintiff failed to act in a commercially reasonable 
manner. 
As noted earlier, Georgia law applies to the procedural issues before this Court. As to 
affirmative defenses, it is well established that once a plaintiff as movant has established a prima 
facie right to judgment as a matter of law "the burden shift[s] to [the nonmovant] to produce or 
point to evidence in the record which establishe[s] an affirmative defense." Secured Realty Inv. 
v. Bank ofN. Georgia, 314 Ga. App. 628, 629-30, 725 S.E.2d 336, 339 (2012) (citing to Helton 
v. Jasper Banking Co., 311 Ga. App. 363, 363-364, 715 S.E.2d 765 (2011); see also Reece v. 
Chestatee State Bank, 260 Ga. App. 136, 138(1), 579 S.E.2d 11 (2003); Miller v. 
Calhoun/Johnson Co., 230 Ga. App. 648, 649-650(3)(b), 497 S.E.2d 397 (1998). Thus, under 
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Georgia law, Defendants have the burden of proof with respect to their affirmative defenses. 
2) Pending Discovery 
Defendants argue that this Court may not decide the instant motion because discovery has 
not been completed and there are still depositions that are outstanding. However, a trial court is 
not required to wait until the end of the prescribed discovery period before ruling on summary 
judgment. Govindasamy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 311 Ga. App. 452, 453-54, 715 S.E.2d 737, 
739-40 (2011). A plaintiff may move for summary judgment "at any time, after the expiration of 
30 days from the commencement of the action." Id. (citing to OCGA § 9-l 1-56(a)). If a 
respondent requires further discovery to properly respond to a summary judgment motion, 
possible responses may include filing a motion to extend the time to respond to the motion, a 
motion to compel if the responses are overdue, or an affidavit pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(-f) 
setting forth why the respondent is unable to proceed without further discovery. Govindasamy, 
311 Ga. App. at 454 (affirming the grant of a motion for swnmary judgment and noting that the 
record did not reveal any effort on the part of the appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court 
on his request for a continuance, nor did the record indicate that the appellant objected to the trial 
court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to obtaining the responses to his Requests 
for Admissions, and thus he had not preserved this issue for appellate review). 
Here, as noted in the Court's December 3, 2018 Order on Pending Motions and Setting 
Hearing, 
[u]nder OCGA § 9-ll-56(a), a plaintiff may move for summary judgment 
"at any time." "Thus, it is not unusual for discovery to be ongoing at the 
time summary judgment motions are filed and/or ruled upon." Corry v. 
Robinson. 207 Ga.App. 167, 170(3), 427 S.E.2d 507 (1993). But when a 
party is "faced with a motion for summary judgment and the unavailability 
of evidence to rebut such motion," a party must seek relief under OCGA § 
9-11-56(±). NationsBank. N.A. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ga .. N.A., 226 
Ga.App. 888, 895(2), 487 S.E.2d 701 (1997) (physical precedent only). 
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915 Indian Trail. LLC v. State Bank & Tr. Co., 328 Ga. App. 524, 533-34, 759 S.E.2d 654, 662 
(2014). Defendants have not satisfied O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-56(f) nor have they demonstrated grounds 
wan-anting any further continuance of this matter. 
3) Governing Contract 
Defendants assert that the Motion for Summary Judgment should fail because there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to which of the existing agreements governs the parties' 
relationship. Defendants assert that the OAs the parties signed for each of the Subject Entities 
governs the parties' conduct and this dispute. Movants dispute the validity of the OAs asserting 
that Mr. Hasid's signature on those agreements was fraudulently obtained. Instead, Movants 
assert the Hebrew Agreement governs. 
Insofar as the declaratory judgment claim asks this Court to make a finding as to the 
parties' ownership interests in the Subject Entities, the only agreement that discusses the subject 
matter is the Hebrew Agreement. Thus, this Court can make a ruling on the declaratory judgment 
claim without deciding which of the subsequent OAs govern and/or are valid and whether the 
English agreements superseded the Hebrew one. 
This approach is consistent with the merger rule. Under the merger rule, "[a]n existing 
contract is superseded and discharged whenever the parties subsequently enter upon a valid and 
inconsistent agreement completely covering the subject-matter embraced by the original 
contract." Atlanta Integrity Mortg .. Inc. v. Ben Hill United Methodist Church, 286 Ga. App. 795, 
797, 650 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2007) ("the Customer Fee Agreement and the Commitment Letter did 
not purport to cover the same subject matter.") (quoting Hennessy v. Woodruff, 210 Ga. 742, 
744(1), 82 S.E.2d 859 (1954) (citation and punctuation omitted.l); see also Wallace v. Bock, 279 
Ga. 744, 745(1), 620 S.E.2d 820 (2005). "The rational basis for the merger rule is that where 
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parties enter into a final contract[,] all prior negotiations, understandings, and agreements on the 
same subject matter are merged into the final contract, and are accordingly extinguished." 
Wallace, 279 Ga. at 745(1). 
Notably, Georgia courts require "a showing of more than a similarity of subject matter." 
Wallace, 279 Ga. at 746. In order for the merger rule to apply, the parties of the merging 
contracts must be the same and the terms of those contracts must completely cover the same 
subject matter and be inconsistent. Id. at 745-746(1 ), 620 S.E.2d 820 (holding that a purchase 
agreement and subsequent escrow agreement dealing with real property did not merge because 
the purchase agreement included an obligation to complete construction and convey title, while 
the escrow agreement dealt only with the construction) (emphasis added); see also Noorani C- 
Stores v. Trico v. Petroleum, 281 Ga. App. 635, 640(3), 637 S.E.2d 208 (2006) (holding that one 
corporation cannot rely on a merger clause in a contract entered into by another corporation). 
Here, the terms to of the required capital contributions are only discussed in the Hebrew 
Agreement. Thus, because the Hebrew Agreement and the OAs do not cover the same subject 
matter and are not inconsistent, this Court can rule on the declaratory judgment claim as a matter 
of law without making a finding as to the validity and enforceability of the OAs. Additionally, 
insofar as Kieffer has stated on the record under oath that the Hebrew Agreement reflected the 
agreement of the parties' as to their respective obligations in the context of their partnership, 
specifically regarding the required capital contributions, the validity and enforceability of the 
Hebrew Agreement are not in dispute. 14 
14 Q: My understanding is that you testified that you had an informal agreement with Mr. Hasid to contribute 
JO percent of the capital for the five entities, right? 
A: I would say subsequent to the Chamblee deal, it was an understanding between the two of us. 
Q: That understanding was based on the Hebrew Agreement in part, right? 
A: It was based on our conversation that this is what the terms of our partnership would be. 
Kieffer Deposition, 25: 16-25 (Apri I I 0, 2018). 
14 
C. Analysis and Conclusions of Law 
I) Declaratory Judgment Claim 
In count IX of the First Amended Complaint ('"F AC"), Movants, relying on the Hebrew 
Agreement, assert Addison Capital contractually committed itself to contribute 10% cash in 
capital contributions to each of the Subject Entities. However, Movants allege it failed and/or 
refused to make any capital contributions and, thus, as a matter of law it "never became a 
member of any of the [Subject Entities]."15 According to Movants, Addison Capital "has no 
legal or equitable interest in any of the Subsidiaries."16 Movants further contend that BH Hasid 
owed no fiduciary duty to Addison Capital and Addison Capital should be estopped from making 
such affirmative defenses or counterclaims in this action. 17 Movants submit that Addison 
Capital's failure to make capital contributions is a breach of the Hebrew Agreement. 
Addison Capital disputes Movants' allegations and asserts there are unresolved issues of 
fact as to: i) the amounts and forms of the required capital contributions; ii) whether Tzion Hasid 
waived its right to disqualify Addison Capital; and iii) whether Tzion Hasid ratified the form of 
Addison Capital's capital contributions. Kieffer, owner and member of Addison Capital, further 
responds that the proceeds from the loans qualify as a capital contribution because the proceeds 
were distributable cash as defined in the OAs. Kieffer elaborates that the Loan proceeds are "the 
property disbursements to the members ... [s]o ... 20% of that money was to be [his] money .. 
. " which he immediately reinvested in the business. Hearing Transcript, 168:9-12 (April 11, 
2018); Id. at 132:8-9 ("20 percent of that cash belongs to me. And all that 20 percent has been 
reinvested in all the properties"); Kieffer Deposition, 26: 11-16 (April 10, 2018) ("I have 





FAC, if 167. 
FAC, 1168. 
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distributed and dispersed between the partners. When it gets reallocated into the same or other 
projects, it is on behalf of the partner's interest"); Id. at 27:8-10 ("When cash came from 
refinance and should have been dispersed according to our percentages. That cash gets 
reallocated and put back in"). 
i) BH Chamblee, LLC - "Heights al Chamblee" 
The Chamblee property was purchased in December 2012. It is undisputed that Addison 
Capital's required capital contribution was made from the proceeds of the PrivCap loan.18 
Defendants argue that Aryeh Kieffer's "understanding ... [was] that he was simply expected to 
provide financing of any kind in the amount of ten (I 0) percent of the total venture cost .... "19 
Thus, Defendants argue there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the form of the required 
capital contribution. Movants respond that the PrivCap loan does not qualify as a capital 
contribution as a matter of law because it was issued in BH Chamblee's name as a "borrower" 
and the Chamblee Property was used as collateral for the PrivCap loan. 
The agreement that speaks to the parties' respective obligations regarding capital 
contributions is the Hebrew Agreement the parties entered into when they purchased the 
Chamblee Property. Section 7.1 of the Hebrew Agreement notes that "[a]n initial investment 
amount ... will be invested by the parties ... each according to his part ... " Thus, at issue here 
is whether a loan can be considered a capital contribution by a member into an LLC where the 
LLC is listed as borrower and real estate owned by the LLC is the collateral for the loan. 
Florida courts have held that a capital contribution is defined as "[ c ]ash, property, or 
services contributed by partners to a partnership." Wells Fargo Bank. N.A. v. Palm Beach Mall, 
LLC, 177 So. 3d 3 7, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ( citing to Black's Law Dictionary 23 7 (9th 
18 Kieffer Deposition, 28:3-7 (April I 0, 2018); Hearing Transcript, 120:4-12 (April 11, 20 I 8). 
Counterclaim Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to BH Hasid, LLC, Hasid Holdings, and 
Roni Avraham's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Defendants' Response"), p. 30-31. 
19 
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ed.2009) ("Palm Beach Mall"). However, for cash to qualify as a capital contribution it must 
become part of the entity's assets and must be given "without the expectation of repayment." 
Palm Beach Mall, 177 So. 3d at 51 (finding that a loan from a member to the entity is a capital 
contribution where the loan increased the member's equity in the entity and it also became part 
of the entity's assets, expressly noting that the member contributed the cash "without the 
expectation of repayment"). Florida courts have also held that transfers without consideration 
are capital contributions. Reed v. Honoshofsky, 76 So. 3d 948,951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) In 
contrast, "[c]ontributions in the form of education, experience, daily operation, and ability to 
obtain loans constitute expertise ... [are] not capital contributions." Agric. Land Servs., Inc. v. 
State, Dep't of Transp., 715 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ( emphasis added). 
Whether a security constitutes equity or debt depends on the interpretation of the contract 
between the corporation and the security holders. In re SubMicron Systems Corp., 291 B.R. 314 
(D. Del. 2003), aff'd, 432 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2006). In interpreting the contract, the court 
considers the name given to the instrument, the intent of the parties, the presence or absence of a 
fixed maturity date, the right to enforce payment of principal and interest, and the certainty of 
payment in the event of the corporation's insolvency or liquidation. In re SubMicron Systems 
Corp., 291 B.R. 314 (D. Del. 2003), aff'd, 432 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Here, at the time the Chamblee Property was purchased, the property itself and the owner 
entity, BH Chamblee, were subject to the PrivCap loan. It is undisputed by the parties that Tzion 
Hasid contributed the required $2.16 million toward the purchase price. Defendants contend that 
Addison Capital's 10% required contribution, $240,000, was satisfied through the proceeds from 
the PrivCap loan." However, unlike in Palm Beach Mall where the cash contributed by the 
member "became part of [the entity's] assets," here, the PrivCap loan served to increase BH 
20 Hearing Transcript, 120:9-12 (April 11, 2018). 
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Chamblee's debts instead. Additionally, the loan was not issued to BH Chamblee "without the 
expectation of repayment," instead, the loan document specifically indicates the presence of a 
fixed maturity date, the tight to enforce payment of principal and interest, etc. In fact, it is 
undisputed that the PrivCap loan was repaid by BH Chamblee by means of another loan also 
taken out by BH Chamblee as borrower. 21 
The Court is not persuaded by Defendants' argument that the loan proceeds qualified as 
distributions. Even assuming that the OAs are valid and enforceable, the agreements contemplate 
a distribution only in certain circumstances. 
In the event of a refinancing, recapitalization, or other capital restructure resulting 
in availability of distributable cash, Cash Available shall be distributed to the 
Members in accordance with the following: 
(a) First, to the repayment of any mortgage loan, notes, liens, payables, or other 
debts or liabilities ... 
(b) Second, to the establishment of any reserve that the Members may determine 
to be reasonably necessary and adequate for any contingent liabilities ... 
(c) Third, to the Members on a pro-rata basis to the extent of their Percentage 
Interest ... 
Operating Agreement of Addison Hasid IV LLC, iJ20; Operating Agreement of BH Chamblee, 
iJ20; Operating Agreement of Winston Manor, LLC, iJ20; Operating Agreement of Addison 
Hasid V, LLC, iJ20; Operating Agreement of Addison Hasid VI, iJ20. It is clear from the record 
that there were outstanding obligations such that no proper distributions could be made pursuant 
to subsection ( c) above. 
Defendants also alleges the PrivCap loan is a proper capital contribution because even 
though the loan was issued to BH Chamblee and secured by BH Chamblee's property, it was 
personally guaranteed by Kieffer. In support, Kieffer points out that the loan was not a true 
arms-length transaction, evident by the fact that the loan, although seemed by the property, was 
21 Hearing Transcript, 133: 1-11 (April 11, 2018). 
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issued before BI-I Chamblee acquired the property. Thus, Kieffer asserts, the loan was issued to 
him as a result of his relationship with the lender. Hearing Transcript, 124: 13-17 (April 11, 
2018) ("As far as I knew, I was borrowing the funds ... That was a loan made to me, personally to 
me, that I personally guaranteed."); Kieffer Deposition, 40: 18, 24 (April 10, 2018) ("It was 
primarily a relationship-based loan.") However, the "ability to obtain loans constitute[ s] 
expertise" and does not qualify as a capital contribution to the business. Agric. Land Servs., lnc., 
715 So. 2d at 298. Thus, even if the Court construes aU evidence in favor of Defendants as the 
non-rnovant, the PrivCap does not qualify as a capital contribution as a matter of law. 
Defendants assert, in the alternative, if this Court finds that Addison CapitaJ did not make 
capital contributions in the proper form and/or amount, the Court should nonetheless find that 
Tzion Hasid waived his right to disqualify Addison Capital as a proper member when he 
discovered the purported shortfall but nonetheless accepted a $50,000 distribution from the 
Resurgens Loan. 22 
"Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be established by 
express statements or implied by conduct. An implied waiver is one shown by a party's decisive, 
unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring the intent to waive." Mullis v. Bibb Cty., 294 Ga. 
App. 721,725,669 S.E.2d 716, 720 (2008). Waiver "is essentially a matter of intent based upon 
full knowledge of all the material facts, and the evidence relied upon to prove a waiver must be 
so clearly indicative of an intent to relinquish a then known particular right or benefit as to 
exclude any other reasonable explanation." Gilbert v. Canterbury Farms. LLC, 346 Ga. App. 
804, 814, 815 S.E.2d 303,311 (2018), reconsideration denied (July 12, 2018) (citing Wyndham 
Lakes Homeowners Assn .. Inc. v. Gray, 303 Ga. App. 45, 48 (2), 692 S.E.2d 704 (2010). Under 
Georgia law, waiver is an affirmative defense and Defendants have the burden to "produce or 
22 Defendants' Response, p. 33. 
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point to evidence in the record which establishe[s] an affirmative defense." Secured Realty Inv. 
v. Bank ofN. Georgia, 314 Ga. App. 628, 629-30, 725 S.E.2d 336,339 (2012) (citing to Helton 
v. Jasper Banking Co., 311 Ga. App. 363, 363-364, 715 S.E.2d 765 (2011); see also Reece v. 
Chestatee State Bank, 260 Ga. App. 136, 138(1), 579 S.E.2d 11 (2003); Miller v. 
Calhoun/Johnson Co., 230 Ga. App. 648, 649-650(3)(b), 497 S.E.2d 397 (1998). 
In dispute here is whether the proceeds from the PrivCap Loan constitute a proper and 
legally cognizable capital contribution on behalf of Kieffer and Addison Capital. Defendants' 
only citation to the record is to Kieffer's April 10, 2018 deposition where Kieffer states that he 
discussed the distribution with Tzion Hasid and that Tzion Hasid wanted to get the $50,000 
distribution from the Resurgens loan. However, Defendants have not pointed to any evidence in 
the record that would indicate Tzion Hasid had full knowledge of all the material facts 
surrounding the PrivCap loan. To the contrary, Defendants admit that Tzion Hasid was not aware 
of the existence of the PrivCap loan at the time of either the PrivCap loan transaction or the 
Resurgens loan transaction. (Kieffer Deposition, 44:4-5 (April 10, 2018) (Q: [D]id you ever tell 
Tzion Hasid that you were borrowing money from Privf'ap for your capital contribution? A: "I 
don't believe I told him where it was from") 
Defendants also assert an affirmative defense of ratification, arguing that Tzion Hasid 
ratified the form of Addison Capital's capital contributions when Tzion Hasid accepted the 
$50,000 distribution from the Resurgens Loan. 
Ratification, the confirmation by one of an act performed by another without authority, is 
an affirmative defense, and the burden of proving it is on the party asserting it. Hendrix v. First 
Bank of Savannah, 195 Ga. App. 510,511,394 S.E.2d 134, 135 (1990) (citing Griggs v. Dodson, 
223 Ga. 164, 169, 171(2), 154 S.E.2d 252 (1967). The ratification must be made by the principal 
20 
with knowledge of the material facts, and "may be express or implied from the acts or silence of 
the principal." O.C.G.A. § 10-6-52. "[I]f the principal, with fuJI knowledge of all the material 
facts, accepts and retains the benefits of the unauthorized act, he thereby ratifies the act." 
Hendrix v. First Bank of Savannah, 195 Ga. App. 510, 511, 394 S.E.2d 134, 135 (1990) 
(emphasis added) (citing Hyer v. C & S Nat. Bank, 188 Ga. App. 452, 453, 373 S.E.2d 391 
(1988)). Defendants assert there exists an issue of material fact as to when Tzion Hasid learned 
about the details of the PrivCap transaction. 
The issue is whether Tzion Hasid ratified the PrivCap loan and its serving as Addison 
Capital's capital contribution by accepting the distribution from the Resurgens loan. As with 
Defendants' waiver defense, to establish a defense of ratification Defendants must show that 
Tzion Hasid "with full knowledge of all the material facts, accept[ ed] and retain[ ed] the 
benefits of the unauthorized act." Defendants have failed to point to evidence in the record 
supporting all essential elements to this defense. By way of example, Defendants have failed to 
show that Tzion Hasid had "full knowledge of all material facts" as it related to the PrivCap loan. 
Finally, Defendants argue that even if this Court finds that Defendants did not make 
proper capital contributions, and even if the Court finds that Tzion Hasid did not waive or ratify 
the shortfalls of the capital contributions, the Court should nonetheless find that Defendants have 
equity in the joint deal(s) as a result of Defendants having put "at least $60,000" into the 
businesses. 23 
Florida courts have held that "the proper relief [for the trial court to grant] would have 
been to adjust the ownership in the venture in accordance with the funds actually advanced 
[toward the purchase price] ... " Malkus v. Gaines, 434 So. 2d 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 
(instructed trial court to adjust ownership interest in accordance with the amount the parties 
23 Memorandum in Opposition To Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 30. 
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contributed when purchasing the property) (citing to Donahue v. Davis, 68 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1953) 
("Equity should restore the parties by reallocating the stock to each party in the ratio that his 
actual contribution bore to the actual purchase price of the property.t'j) 
Here, the amount of $60,000 which Defendants refer to was contributed by Defendants in 
relation to paying 10 percent of certain bills and liabilities, including, the Chamblee Property's 
water and trash bills, City of Atlanta fines, and a payment toward an extension of the Silver Point 
loan that became due in December 2017 .2'1 Insofar as these payments were made "since this 
lawsuit has been filed?" and were not made toward "the actual purchase price of the property," 
the payments do not qualify as capital contributions and this Court does not need to consider 
them when reallocating interest in the entity. 
Insofar as the loans discussed above do not constitute a capital contribution, the Court 
finds and declares that Defendants are not members of BH Chamblee, LLC. 
ii) BH Winston Manor, LLC - "Winston Manor" 
Although the parties did not enter into a separate Hebrew Agreement in relation to the 
purchase of Winston Manor, it is undisputed that the parties agreed that the terms of their 
business relationship required Addison Capital to contribute 10 percent of the capital for each of 
the Subject Entities and properties purchased subsequent to the Chamblee deal. 
Q: My understanding is that you testified that you had an informal agreement with 
Mr. Hasid to contribute 10 percent of the capital for the five entities, right? 
A: I would say subsequent to the Chamblee deal, it was an understanding between 
the two of us. 
Q: That understanding was based on the Hebrew Agreement in part, right? 
A: It was based on our conversation that this is what the terms of our partnership 
would be. 
24 Hearing Transcript, 132: 14-16 (April 11, 2018) (Q: Since this lawsuit has been filed, you've put in between 
50 and $60,000, right? A: That's correct.) (emphasis added). 
25 Hearing Transcript, 132:14-16 (April 11, 2018) (Q: Since this lawsuit has been filed, you've put in 
between 50 and $60,000, right? A: That's correct.) (emphasis added). 
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Kieffer Deposition, 25:16-25 (April 10, 2018). 
BH Winston Manor purchased the Winston Manor Property on October 21, 2013 for an 
adjusted purchase price of $542,000. That same day BH Hasid contributed $700,000 for the 
purpose of purchasing the Winston Manor Property. Hearing Transcript, 137:6, 16-22; 139:13- 
17 (April 11, 2018). Addison Capital did not make a cash contribution toward the purchase price. 
Instead, Addison Capital contends that its portion of the purchase price was taken from the 
proceeds of a second PrivCap loan. Hearing Transcript, 162: 19-22 (Q: "And you would agree 
that you did not make a cash contribution towards the purchase of Winston Manor, correct?" A: 
"Correct."); Kieffer Deposition, 43 :5, 10 (April 10, 2018) (Q: "How many other loans have 
Addison or you done with PrivCap?" A:"The answer is two other loans ... Winston Manor and 
Roosevelt Addison 5."). The borrower on this second PrivCap loan was BH Chamblee. 
Again, the inquiry here is whether proceeds from a loan borrowed against the property 
and issued to another entity (BH Chamblee, LLC) constitute a valid capital contribution. As held 
above, even assuming the OAs are valid and enforceable, the record reflects that BH Chamblee 
had outstanding obligations such that no proper distributions could be made pursuant to 
subsection (c) of the operating agreement. The same analysis as summarized in Part IV(C)(l)(i), 
supra, applies with respect to Defendants' required capital contribution to become a member of 
BH Winston Manor, LLC. Insofar as the loans discussed above do not constitute a capital 
contribution, the Court finds and declares that Defendants are not members of BH Winston 
Manor, LLC. 
iii) Addison Hasid JV, LLC- "Washington Arms" 
It is undisputed that the parties agreed that the terms of their partnership called for 
Defendants to contribute IO percent of the capital for each of the Subject Entities and the 
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properties purchased subsequent to the Chamblee deal." 
The Washington Arms Property was purchased on December 9, 2014 for a purchase price 
of $170,000.27 BH Hasid made a contribution of $150,000 on November 21, 2014 to be used 
toward the purchase of that property." The record is not clear which loan was used to supply 
Defendants' ten percent share of the purchase price, however, it is not in dispute that Defendants 
used loan proceeds for the pm-pose of a capital contributions, similarly to the other properties 
discussed in this Order. 
The same analysis as summarized in Part IV(C)(l)(i), supra, applies with respect to 
Defendants' required capital contribution to become a member of Addison Hasid IV, LLC. 
Insofar as the loans discussed above do not constitute a capital contribution, the Court finds and 
declares that Defendants are not members of Addison Hasid IV, LLC. 
iv) Addison Hasid V, LLC - "Roosevelt" 
The Roosevelt Property was pm-chased on July 1, 2015 for $440,000. Hearing Transcript, 
145:21, 25 (April 11, 2018). The Hasids made a contribution of $100,000 on January 21, 2015, 
presumably to be used toward the purchase price of Roosevelt. Despite a contribution from the 
Hasids, the property was purchased entirely from the Silver Point Loan. Hearing Transcript, 
147:6 (April 11, 2018). The Silver Point Loan was ultimately seemed by the Chamblee, Sierra 
Ridge, and Roosevelt Properties. Hearing Transcript, 169: 1-6; 180:7-9 (April 11, 2018). The 
borrower on the Silver Point loan was BH Chamblee, LLC. The same analysis as summarized in 
Part IV(C)(l)(i), supra, applies with respect to Defendants' required capital contribution to 
become a member of Addison Hasid V, LLC. Insofar as the loans discussed above do not 




See Kieffer Deposition, 25: 16-25 (April I 0, 2018). 
Hearing Transcript, 141 :2-4. 
Hearing Transcript, 141 :2, 9, 19-22. 
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Addison Hasid V, LLC. 
v) Addison Hasid VJ, LLC- "Sierra Ridge" 
The Sierra Ridge Property was purchased on April 22, 2016 for $3.45 million. BH Hasid 
made a contribution in the amount of $3.179 million toward the purchase of that property. 
Hearing Transcript, 148:21-25; 149:12-20. (April 11, 2018). The record reflects that not all of 
I-Iasid's contribution was used to purchase Sierra Ridge; instead $ 1. 15 million dollars from the 
Silver Point Loan were used in the closing. Id. at 149:21-25. Defendants assert Addison Capital's 
share of the capital contributions toward the purchase price was taken out of the proceeds from 
the Silver Point loan. BH Chamblee was the borrower on the Silver Point Loan. The same 
analysis as summarized in Part IV(C)(l)(i), supra, applies with respect to Defendants' required 
capital contribution to become a member of Addison Hasid VI, LLC. Insofar as the loans 
discussed above do not constitute a capital contribution, the Court finds and declares that 
Defendants are not members of Addison Hasid VI, LLC. 
Having considered the entire record and given the foregoing analysis, the Court 
GRANTS the Movants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count IX of the First 
Amended Complaint and enters a declaratory judgment in favor of BI-I Hasid, finding the record 
demonstrates: that Addison Capital failed to contribute capital to the Subject Entities as agreed to 
by the parties. Therefore the Court further finds that Addison Capital was never a member of the 
Subject Entities; and that BH Hasid never owed Addison Capital a fiduciary duty with respect to 
the Subject Entities. 
2) Counterclaims 1-7 
Counterclaim-Defendants move this Court for summary judgment on all of Defendants' 
counterclaims. Defendants have not responded to Movant's Motion for Partial Summary 
25 
Judgment. 
i) Breach of Fiduciary Duty (against all Counterclaim- 
Defendants) 
Defendants allege that the Counterclaim-Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by 
leaving the entities undercapitalized despite being aware of the financial status of each entity. 
Additionally, Defendants allege that Avrabam improperly withdrew money from an account 
owned by Addison Advisors without the permission of Addison Advisors. 
Under Florida law, "[t]he elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are 
(1) the existence of a duty, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) damages flowing from the breach." 
Cassedy v. Alland Investments Corp., 128 So. 3d 976, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing 
Crusselle v. Mong, 59 So.3d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011 )). See also Engelman v. Kessler, 
340 Ga. App. 239, 246, 797 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2017), cert. denied (Aug. 14, 2017) (Under 
Georgia law, "[i]t is well settled that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three 
elements: (I) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage 
proximately caused by the breach") (citing Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 849-850 (2), 
670 S.E.2d 508 (2008)). 
Given this Court's ruling that Addison Capital is not a member of any of the Subject 
Entities, any duties owed to it would arise out of Addison Capital's role as a manager of the 
Subject Entities. Thus, the inquiry before this Court centers on what duties the non-managing 
members of an entity owe the manager of that entity. In relation to the five Subject Entities, it is 
undisputed BH Hasid was a member of each of the Subject Entities, Hasid Holdings was not 
formed until November 2017 and had no role during the timeframe of the conduct alleged, and 
Roni Avraham became BH Hasid's manager in October 2017. 
Under Georgia law, "[i]f a member is not managing the affairs of the company, then no 
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such duty attaches." Inland Atl. Old Nat. Phase L LLC v. 6425 Old Nat., LLC, 329 Ga. App. 
671,674, 766 S.E.2d 86, 90-91 (2014) (citing ULQ. LLC v. Meder, 293 Ga. App. 176, 184(7), 
666 S.E.2d 713 (2008)). Moreover, unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement or 
articles of organization, "where a member is not a manager in a company in which management 
is vested in one or more managers ... that member shall have no duties to the limited liability 
company or to the other members solely by reason of acting in his or her capacity as a member." 
ULQ. LLC v. Meder, 293 Ga. App. 176, 184(7), 666 S.E.2d 713 (2008). 
Thus, under Georgia law, BH Hasid, in its capacity as a non-managing member did not 
owe a fiduciary duty to the Subject Entities, the other members, or the manager. Even if this 
Court assumes the OAs are valid, none of them assign a duty owed by a non-managing member 
to the manager. Georgia law is also silent as to the existence of any duty a non-managing 
member owes the entity's manager. Under Florida law, "[ejach manager of a manager-managed 
limited liability company and a member of a member-managed limited liability company owes 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the limited liability company and members of the limited 
liability company." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 605.04091. Florida law is silent as to any existing duty 
owed to a manager of an entity by the members of the entity. 
Having considered the record and given the Court's rulings in this case, the Court finds 
the Counterclaim-Defendants have shown there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on 
an essential element of Defendants' breach of fiduciary duty claim-the existence of a fiduciary 
duty owed by Counterclaim-Defendants to Defendants-and Defendants have failed to point to 
evidence showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Scarbrough, 240 Ga. App. at 830; O.C.G.A. 
§9-11-56( e ). BH Hasid, in its capacity as a member of the Subject Entities did not owe any 
fiduciary duties to Addison Capital in its capacity as manager of the Subject Entities. Insofar as 
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Hasid Holdings had no role in the Subject Entities, Defendants have not set forth any basis in law 
or fact that would show Hasid Holdings owned Addison Capital any fiduciary duty. 
Additionally, although Roni Avraham acting for BH Hasid replaced Kieffer and Addison Capital 
as the manager of the Subject Entities, he had no role in the entities before Kieffer's removal 
and, thus, the record does not reflect that he owed any fiduciary to Kieffer or Addison Capital. 
Finally, Defendants have not shown any basis in law or fact that would suggest that BH Hasid, in 
its capacity of a non-managing member of the entities, owed any fiduciary duty to Addison 
Advisors. Accordingly, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to this 
counterclaim. 
ii) Aiding and Abe/ling Breaches of Fiduciary Duty (against 
Avraham) 
Defendants allege that Avraham assisted BH Hasid in breaching its fiduciary duty, 
contending that Avraham improperly held himself out to be the manager of the Subject Entities 
and he accessed and took money from an account belonging to Addison Advisors, which was 
meant to the be operating account of the Managed Entities, in order to pay himself a 
management fee. 
"Aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is recognized in Florida." Tumberry Vilt. 
N. Tower Condo. Ass'n. Inc. v. Turnberry Yill. S. Tower Condo. Ass'n. Inc., 224 So. 3d 266, 267 
n. 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Fonseca v. Taverna Imports. Inc., 212 So. 3d 431,442 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2017)). Such a claim requires the claimant to prove: (1) a fiduciary duty on the 
part of a primary wrongdoer, (2) a breach of that fiduciary duty, (3) knowledge of the breach by 
the alleged aider and abettor, and (4) the aider and abettor's substantial assistance or 
encouragement of the wrongdoing." Id. See also Kahn v. Britt, 330 Ga. App. 377, 389, 765 
S.E.2d 446,458 (2014) 
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Because the Court finds that the record does not reflect that Counterclaim-Defendants 
owed Defendants any fiduciary duty, the counterclaim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
duty fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED with respect to the aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim. 
iii) Breach of the Operating Agreements (against BH Hasid) 
Defendants allege that BH Hasid violated the OAs by attempting to remove Addison 
Capital as the Manager of the Subject Entities without following the requirements in their 
respective operating agreement. 
"The elements of an action for breach of contract are: (I) the existence of a contract, (2) a 
breach of the contract, and (3) damages resulting from the breach." Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. 
Gregory. Inc., 16 So. 3d 979, 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Knowles v. C.I.T. Corp., 346 
So.2d 1042, I 043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)). See also SAWS at Seven Hills. LLC v. Forestar Realty. 
Inc., 342 Ga. App. 780, 784, 805 S.E.2d 270, 274 (2017) ("The elements for a breach of contract 
claim in Georgia are the (1) breach and the (2) resultant damages (3) to the party who has the 
right to complain about the contract being broken") (citing Dewrell Sacks. LLP v. Chicago Title 
Ins. Co., 324 Ga. App. 219,223 (2) (a), 749 S.E.2d 802 (2013)). 
Defendants have failed to establish the occurrence of a breach. The conduct underlying 
this claim is Plaintiffs "attempt[] to remove Addison Capital as the Manager without following 
the requirements of the operating agreements.'?" However, the record shows that Addison 
Capital was the manager of the Subject Entities and Properties until April 12, 2018 when this 
Court removed it from its position following the April 11-12, 2018 hearing. Even if this Court 
assumes that the OAs, and more specifically, the removal provisions are valid and enforceable, 
insofar as Plaintiff did not actually remove Addison Capital as the Manager of the Subject 
29 Defendants' Counterclaim, ~156 (filed on 1/9/2018). 
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Entities and Properties, the Court finds that no breach of the OAs occurred. Accordingly, the 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to the breach of the operating 
agreements counterclaim. 
iv) Defamation (against all counterclaim-defendants) 
Defendants allege the Hasids and people close to them, including Avraham, have made 
defamatory statements regarding Kieffer. 
Under Florida law, "[t]he elements of a claim for defamation are as follows: (1) 
publication; (2) falsity; (3) actor must act with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity 
on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter concerning a private 
person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement must be defamatory." Internet Sols. Corp. v. 
Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1214 (Fla. 2010) (citing Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So.2d 1098, 
1106 (Fla.2008)). See also Eason v. Marine Terminals Corp., 309 Ga. App. 669,672, 710 S.E.2d 
867, 871 (2011). 
Here, Defendants have not pointed to any evidence of a "specific statement" that is false 
and defamatory that was made by any Counterclaim-Defendant and published to a third party. 
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the Counterclaim Defendants on the 
counterclaim for defamation. 
v) Constructive Trust 
According to Defendants' counterclaim, BH Hasid transferred $950,000 into Addison 
Advisors to use as operating capital for the Subject Entities." The funds were maintained in an 
account to which BH Hasid was a signatory." Defendants allege that November 15, 2017, 
Avraham, acting as the agent for BH Hasid, improperly withdrew $376,000, the remaining 
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Defendants' Counterclaim, ~179 (filed on 1/9/2018). 
Defendants' Counterclaim, ~181 (tiled on 1/9/2018). 
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balance in the account." They assert a constructive trust should be imposed on those funds "on 
the basis that A vraham withdrew the money without the authorization of Addison Advisors, 
Addison Capital acting as the Manager or [sic] the Managed Entities, or any of the Managed 
Entities.'?" Alternatively, Defendants assert they are entitled to damages. 
Under both Florida and Georgia law, a constructive trust is a remedial device created to 
prevent unjust enrichment. See Provence v. Palm Beach Taverns, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1022, 1025 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (applying Florida law); Prof] Energy Mgmt.. Inc. v. Necaise, 300 Ga. 
App. 223, 228, 684 S.E.2d 374, 380 (2009) (applying Georgia law). A constructive trust arises 
not from the intent of the parties, but by equity with respect to property acquired by fraud, or 
although acquired without fraud, where it is against equity that the property should be retained 
by the one who holds it. See Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419, 422 (1927); Bunch v. 
Byington, 292 Ga. App. 497, 503, 664 S.E.2d 842, 847 (2008). 
Florida courts have held that "a constructive trust requires a showing of fraud, undue 
influence, abuse of confidence or mistake." Meltzer v. Estate of Norrie, 705 So. 2d 967, 968 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). Similarly, under Georgia law a constructive trust "is not an 
independent cause of action" but rather is a device by which property may be recovered if the 
person holding the property was unjustly enriched. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 270 Ga. 
136,508 S.E.2d 646 (1998). See also IO Ga. Jur. § 21:13 ("[C]onstructive trusts may be imposed 
based on other conduct or circumstances, including bad faith, duress, coercion, undue influence, 
abuse of confidence or violation of a fiduciary relationship, or mistake in the transaction that 
originates the problem, by commission of a wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, 
artifice, concealment, or questionable means, by which one, in any way against equity and good 
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conscience, either obtained or holds the legal right to property which this person ought not, in 
equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy"). 
Here, Defendants have not asserted any claim or circumstance upon which to predicate its 
request for the Court to impose a constructive trust. Insofar as they plainly allege the funds at 
issue were transferred by BH Hasid and were to be used as "operating capital" for the Subject 
Entities and whereas BH Hasid currently acts as the Manager of the Subject Entities, Defendants 
have failed to establish any basis in fact or law as to why a constructive law is necessary "to 
prevent unjust enrichment" or why Addison Capital would be entitled to damages regarding 
same. Rather, as the current acting Manager, BH Hasid is authorized to access and use the 
Subject Entities' operating capital, including the $376,000 at issue. The Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the counterclaim seeking a constructive trust. 
vi) Negligence 
Defendants assert BH Hasid "had a duty to ensure that the [Subject] Entities were 
properly capitalized to ensure they could continue to operate or be renovated to a point where 
they could operate.'?' However, they allege BH Hasid "serially" left the Subject Entities under- 
capitalized or imposed "unreasonable requirement" on Addison Capital, causing Kieffer and 
Addison Capital to finance several projects with outside loans, including a $9 million loan for 
which Kieffer was a personal guarantor." 
The four elements of common law negligence are (1) a legal duty owed by the defendant 
to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty by the defendant, (3) an injury to the plaintiff legally and 
proximately caused by the defendant's breach, and (4) damages as a result of the injury. See 
Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210, 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Goldstein. Garber & 
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Salama. LLC v. J.B., 300 Ga. 840, 841, 797 S.E.2d 87, 89 (2017). 
Given that the Court has found that Addison Capital and Kieffer are not members of any 
of the Subject Entities, any duties owed to them arise from their position as the manager of the 
Subject Entities. Even assuming that Counterclaim-Defendants under-capitalized the Subject 
Entities as alleged, Defendants have not cited to any duty owed to them as a non-member 
manager to capitalize the Subject Entities nor any damages proximately suffered l;>y them as a 
result of any undercapitalization. Although they allege Addison Capital had to finance several 
projects with outside loans, it is undisputed those loans were taken out by one of the Subject 
Entities. Further, although Kieffer personally guaranteed one of the loans, it is undisputed that 
loan was repaid and Defendants have not identified any injury or damages suffered by them as a 
result of the guaranty. Summary judgment is GRANTED to Counterclaim-Defendants on the 
negligence counterclaim. 
vii) Punitive Damages and Attorneys' Fees 
Insofar as none of the counterclaims survive the instant motion, the Court finds 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages and for attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. §13- 
6-11 fails as a matter of law. See Racette. 318 Ga. App. at 181 ("An award of attorney fees, 
costs, and punitive damages is derivative of a plaintiffs substantive claims") ( citing 
DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. v. Clemente, 294 Ga. App. 38, 52 (2008)). 
CONCLUSION 
Given all of the above, the Court orders as follows: Defendants' Motion to Stay is hereby 
DENIED; Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Appeal is hereby GRANTED; Plaintiffs Amended 
Motion for Accounting is hereby GRANTED; and Movant's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED as set forth above. 
33 
SO ORDERED this 19. day of February, 2019. 
JUDGE ALICE D. BONNER 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Business Case Division 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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